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Sometimes ignorance is a legitimate excuse for 
morally wrong behavior, and sometimes it isn’t. If 
someone has secretly replaced my sugar with arsenic, 
then I’m blameless for putting arsenic in your 
tea.[1] But if I put arsenic in your tea because I keep 
arsenic and sugar jars on the same shelf and don’t 
label them, then I’m blameworthy for poisoning 
you.[2] 
Why is my ignorance in the first case a legitimate 
excuse, but my ignorance in the second case 
isn’t?[3]  This essay explores the relationship between 
ignorance and blameworthiness. 
William S. Jewett (1821–1873) The Promised Land – 
The Grayson Family, 1850 
1. The Blameless Ignorance Principle 
The above cases suggest the Blameless Ignorance 
Principle: 
If a person is blameless for their ignorance, then the 
person is blameless for acting from that ignorance.[4] 
This explains why I’m blameless for poisoning you in 
the first case (since my ignorance isn’t my fault), but 
blameworthy for it in the second case (since my 
ignorance is due to my carelessness). 
While this principle seems sensible, why exactly does 
blameless ignorance excuse? And does blameless 
ignorance always excuse, as the principle implies? 
Two competing positions aim to answer these 
questions. 
2. The Reasonable Expectation Principle 
One position focuses on a person’s ability to avoid 
being ignorant or behaving ignorantly. 
Consider an ancient Hittite lord who owns slaves, 
treats them poorly, and believes that his behavior 
isn’t wrong.[5] Due to the widespread acceptance of 
slavery in his culture, it would be unreasonable to 
expect the slaveowner to realize that slavery is 
wrong. Does the slaveowner’s ignorance excuse 
him?[6] 
According to the Reasonable Expectation Principle: 
If it is unreasonable to expect a person to avoid 
something (e.g., being ignorant or behaving wrongly), 
then the person is not blameworthy for it. 
One way to understand this is that it’s reasonable to 
expect a person to avoid something only if the person 
had the ability to avoid it, given their beliefs and 
cultural setting.[7] So, if the slaveowner never had an 
opportunity to realize that he is mistaken (e.g., by 
reflecting upon his own moral views, or having a 
conversation with someone who opposes slavery, 
etc.), then he is blameless for his ignorance. 
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect 
him not to keep slaves, given his blameless ignorance 
that it’s morally wrong, so he isn’t blameworthy for 
his slaveholding.[8] 
The Reasonable Expectation Principle also explains 
the arsenic cases. In the first case, since someone 
secretly switched my sugar for arsenic, it’s 
unreasonable to expect me to avoid my ignorance 
that I’m poisoning you: I’m blamelessly ignorant of 
that fact. In the second case, however, it is reasonable 
to expect me to avoid my ignorance: I could have 
avoided it by simply labeling my arsenic and sugar 
jars. Since I could have easily avoided that ignorance, 
it’s reasonable to expect me not to ignorantly put 
arsenic in your tea.[9] 
According to the Reasonable Expectation Principle, 
blameless ignorance alwaysexcuses, since it’s always 
unreasonable to expect someone to avoid acting 
wrongly if that person is blamelessly ignorant that 
their action is wrong. 
3. The Objectionable Attitude Principle 
A second position on why and when blameless 
ignorance excuses focuses on the morally 
objectionable attitudes or beliefs expressed in 
morally wrong behavior. According to 
the Objectionable Attitude Principle: 
A person is blameworthy for morally wrong 
behavior if and only if it expresses a morally 
objectionable attitude or belief.[10], [11] 
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The idea here is that when I blame someone for 
treating me poorly, I’m responding to the morally 
objectionable attitudes expressed in or revealed by 
their behavior. Perhaps their behavior expresses a 
desire to harm me, a lack of concern for my well-
being, or a belief that my interests aren’t important. 
If this principle is true, then it doesn’t matter 
whether it’s reasonable to expect someone like the 
slaveowner to behave differently. All that matters is 
that his behavior expresses a morally objectionable 
attitude or belief: insufficient concern for his slaves’ 
well-being, or a belief that their interests aren’t 
important. This implies that even people who are 
blamelessly ignorant of the wrongness of their 
behavior can be blameworthy for it if their actions 
express a morally objectionable attitude or belief.[12] 
We can now distinguish two kinds of ignorance. If I 
put arsenic in your tea while believing it’s sugar, I’m 
ignorant that what I’m doing is morally wrong 
because I’m ignorant of the feature of my action 
that makes it wrong (i.e., that the white substance I 
put in your tea is arsenic, not sugar). This 
is circumstantial ignorance. 
Importantly, circumstantial ignorance prevents the 
expression of objectionable attitudes: it’s impossible 
to perform an action that expresses a desire to harm 
(or an indifference that the action might harm) if one 
is blamelessly ignorant that one’s action might cause 
harm. Accordingly, the Objectionable Attitudes 
Principle implies that blameless circumstantial 
ignorance always excuses. 
The slaveowner’s ignorance is different. He is aware 
of the morally relevant features of his actions (e.g., 
depriving people of freedom, causing suffering, etc.). 
But he fails to realize that these features make his 
behavior wrong. This is moralignorance: ignorance of 
relevant moral principles or the moral relevance of 
various features of one’s behavior.[13] 
The slaveowner’s belief that owning slaves is not 
wrong, despite its harmful effects, itself involves 
insufficient concern for those affected, and so his 
behavior expresses this insufficient concern. 
Proponents of the Objectionable Attitude Principle 
maintain that, while 
blameless circumstantial ignorance always excuses, 
this is not so for blameless moral ignorance.[14] 
4. Conclusion 
Our beliefs and behavior are shaped by our cultures 
and upbringing, which sometimes influence us for the 
worse. Sometimes it is reasonable to expect better of 
people; other times it may not be. When we cannot 
reasonably expect better should we not blame people 
for ignorant beliefs or behavior, as the Reasonable 
Expectation Principle implies? Or should we blame 
people for ignorant beliefs and wrongdoing when 
these express morally objectionable attitudes, as 
implied by the Objectionable Attitudes Principle? 
These questions are pertinent to potentially 
problematic beliefs and actions from nearly every 
aspect of life.[15] 
Notes 
[1] This case and others like it are later described 
as morally wrong behavior. One might reasonably 
wonder, however, whether these are actually cases of 
wrongdoing, given there’s no way I could have 
known that my sugar had been replaced by arsenic. 
One might think that, if you are blameless for what 
you did, then you didn’t do anything wrong. 
While this response is understandable, it’s worth 
thinking about why (blameless) actions can really be 
wrong. One moral theory, consequentialism, says our 
actions must have the best overall consequences, or 
else they are wrong. But poisoning someone surely 
isn’t the action with the best consequences, so it 
would be wrong on that theory. According to most 
moral theories, if an action actually has certain 
characteristics, it is wrong — for instance, if the 
action violates Kant’s Categorical Imperative. 
However, an action might have wrong-making 
characteristics, and yet one might reasonably believe 
that it doesn’t. (For instance, you might reasonably 
believe that feeding someone a sesame bagel will not 
harm them, though as it turns out, they have a 
sesame allergy.) 
“Subjective” theories of wrongness focus on how an 
action is judged from someone’s “subjective” 
perspective, namely, whatever evidence the person 
has for whether a particular action meets an 
objective moral standard.  “Objective” theories of 
wrongness, contrast, attempt to state 
an objective moral standard, independent of an 
individual’s evidence or beliefs. The issues of this 
essay arise from people doing actions 
that are “objectively” wrong, yet it’s arguable that 
people are (at least sometimes) blameless for 
performing those actions, because of ignorance of 
various types. For an introduction to two influential 
objective ethical theories mentioned above, 
see Introduction to Consequentialism by Shane 
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Gronholz and Introduction to Deontology: Kantian 
Ethics by Andrew Chapman. 
[2] This is based on a case offered by Gideon Rosen 
(2004). 
[3] It is often argued that an action must be done of 
someone’s free will in order for that person to be 
morally responsible, or deserving of blame, for that 
action (although some deny this). Indeed, one way to 
understand the debate over free will is as a debate 
over what kind or degree of control one must 
exercise over one’s behavior and character in order 
to be morally responsible (praiseworthy or 
blameworthy) for these things. Thus, much of the 
philosophical literature on moral responsibility 
concerns the “control condition” on moral 
responsibility (see Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility by Chelsea Haramia, Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility by Rebecca 
Renninger and Free Will and Free Choice by Jonah 
Nagashima). Much less of this literature has been 
devoted to what kind or degree of awareness or 
knowledge is needed to be blameworthy for one’s 
behavior and character. This is called the “epistemic 
condition” (epistemology concerns knowledge and 
reasonable belief, so an epistemic concern is about 
that) on moral responsibility. The past ten or fifteen 
years has seen a surge of new work on this topic by a 
number of philosophers working on agency and 
responsibility. In 2017 the first edited volume on the 
topic was published: Responsibility: The Epistemic 
Condition (edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem 
Wieland). 
[4] This principle (or at least a restricted version of it, 
as will be explained later) is accepted by nearly all 
philosophers who write about these issues. For 
articulations and defenses of it, see Gideon Rosen 
(2003) and Michael Zimmerman (1997). 
[5] This case is taken from Gideon Rosen. Rosen 
argues that the slaveowner is blameless for his 
ignorance and therefore blameless for his morally 
wrong behavior (2003, 65-66). 
[6]  In Responding to Morally Flawed Historical 
Philosophers and Philosophies, Victor Fabian 
Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis address the 
question of whether historical philosophers should 
be blamed and held responsible when they had false 
moral views or behaved badly. 
[7] Gideon Rosen (2004) and Neil Levy (2009) present 
and defend this type of view in detail. 
[8] Cases of blameless moral ignorance are arguably 
not confined to ancient history. We can point to cases 
of moral ignorance in more recent history that are 
plausibly blameless. Gideon Rosen offers the example 
of a 1950s sexist who, due to prevailing cultural 
norms, sees nothing wrong with the unfair 
differential treatment of his son and daughter 
(indeed, it may seem to him that the permissibility of 
his differential treatment is self-evident). As Rosen 
points out, we needn’t suppose that he is unreflective 
about his false moral views; we only need to suppose 
that, when he does reflect, the considerations to the 
contrary are bound to seem “wrong-headed” (2003, 
66-68). 
[9] Consider another, similar set of cases: two doctors 
each ignorantly prescribe medicine that a patient is 
seriously allergic to. The first doctor does so simply 
because no one is aware of the allergy, while the 
second doctor does so because he has negligently 
ignored the patient’s medical records. 
[10] Philosophers often understand the term “attitude” 
broadly, to include beliefs as types of attitudes, in 
addition to more typical examples of attitudes (e.g., 
desire, resentment, indifference, gratitude, and so 
on). 
[11] For articulations and defenses of this kind of 
position, see Elizabeth Harman (2011) and Angela 
Smith (2005). 
[12] Matthew Talbert (2013) develops this response 
against Gideon Rosen and Neil Levy. 
[13] This distinction is common in the literature, 
though some theorists use the term “factual 
ignorance” or “non-moral ignorance” to describe 
what I have called “circumstantial ignorance.” 
[14] Elizabeth Harman (2011) maintains that moral 
ignorance never excuses, since moral 
ignorance itself always involves a morally 
objectionable attitude that is then expressed in 
morally ignorant wrongdoing. 
[15] I am grateful to Nathan Nobis, Dan Lowe, Chelsea 
Haramania and Taylor Cyr for thoughtful dialogue 
and helpful feedback on this essay. 
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